Techniques › T1574.005 › AN0108
AN0108 Analytic 0108
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Executables written or modified in installer directories (e.g., %TEMP% subdirectories or Program Files installer paths) followed by execution under elevated context. Defender observes abnormal file replacement activity, process creation by installer processes pointing to attacker-supplied binaries, and unexpected module loads in elevated processes.</p>
- Detects
- T1574.005 Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
- Part of
- DET0038 Detection Strategy for Hijack Execution Flow using Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=15 | DC0059 File Metadata |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 | DC0016 Module Load |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
MonitoredDirectories | Specific writable directories to monitor (e.g., %TEMP%, C:\ProgramData, installer unpack paths). |
HashBaseline | Known good hashes of installer binaries to detect replacement. |
TimeWindow | Correlation interval between file overwrite and execution event. |
UserContext | Differentiate expected admin-installer execution vs. anomalous user writes. |