Techniques › T1485.001 › AN0117
AN0117 Analytic 0117
IaaS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Adversary with write access to storage modifies lifecycle policies (e.g., via PutBucketLifecycle) to schedule rapid object deletion across one or more storage buckets. This is often used to trigger impact (destruction), remove logs (defense evasion), or force extortion (ransomware).</p>
- Detects
- T1485.001 Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion
- Part of
- DET0041 Detection of Lifecycle Policy Modifications for Triggered Deletion in IaaS Cloud Storage
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| AWS:CloudTrail | PutBucketLifecycle, PutLifecycleConfiguration, SetBucketLifecycle, storage.buckets.update | DC0023 Cloud Storage Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
LifecycleExpirationDays | Policy values setting Expiration in fewer than N days (e.g., 0–1) are highly suspicious. |
TargetBucket | Filter by bucket types (e.g., log storage, production DB snapshots) to prioritize detection. |
Principal | Correlate rare or anomalous IAM principals making destructive lifecycle changes. |
TimeWindow | Link lifecycle policy change with API activity suggesting staged deletion or extortion attempt. |