Techniques › T1114.001 › AN0130
AN0130 Analytic 0130
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detection focuses on processes that attempt to locate, access, or exfiltrate local Outlook data files (.pst/.ost) using file system access, native Windows utilities (e.g., PowerShell, WMI), or remote access tools with file browsing capabilities. The behavior chain includes directory enumeration, file access, optional compression or staging, and network transfer.</p>
- Detects
- T1114.001 Local Email Collection
- Part of
- DET0047 Detect Local Email Collection via Outlook Data File Access and Command Line Tooling
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4663, 4670, 4656 | DC0055 File Access |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TargetFilePathPattern | Regex or wildcard patterns for sensitive Outlook file paths (.ost/.pst) depending on organizational deployment. |
TimeWindow | Timeframe used to correlate related file access, process creation, and exfiltration events. |
UserContext | Limit detection to user accounts not normally interacting with Outlook file locations (e.g., service accounts, low-privileged users). |
ProcessAllowList | Filter known legitimate Outlook-accessing processes to reduce false positives. |