Techniques › T1505.002 › AN0472
AN0472 Analytic 0472
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Adversary registers a malicious Microsoft Exchange transport agent DLL (.NET assembly), configures it via PowerShell or Exchange Management Shell, and persists code execution by manipulating email processing logic based on rules or headers.</p>
- Detects
- T1505.002 Transport Agent
- Part of
- DET0166 Detection Strategy for T1505.002 - Transport Agent Abuse (Windows/Linux)
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:PowerShell | EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106 | DC0064 Command Execution |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 | DC0016 Module Load |
| WinEventLog:Application | Exchange Transport Service loads unusual .NET assembly or errors upon transport agent execution | DC0038 Application Log Content |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TimeWindow | May need tuning based on frequency of Exchange agent updates in environment. |
AssemblyPath | Specific DLL paths used by Exchange for registered agents may vary between deployments. |
CmdletInvocationThreshold | Tunable threshold for repeated use of transport agent management cmdlets. |