Techniques › T1125 › AN0570
AN0570 Analytic 0570
macOS · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>A non-whitelisted process receives TCC camera entitlement (kTCCServiceCamera), opens AppleCamera/AVFoundation device handles, writes .mov/.mp4 artifacts to unusual locations, and/or beacons/exfiltrates soon after.</p>
- Detects
- T1125 Video Capture
- Part of
- DET0197 Behavior-chain, platform-aware detection strategy for T1125 Video Capture
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| macos:unifiedlog | Access decisions to kTCCServiceCamera for unexpected binaries | DC0021 OS API Execution |
| macos:endpointsecurity | open: Process opens AppleCamera/IOUSB device nodes or AVFoundation frameworks | DC0055 File Access |
| macos:endpointsecurity | exec: Exec of ffmpeg, avfoundation-based binaries, or custom signed apps accessing camera | DC0032 Process Creation |
| macos:unifiedlog | Process wrote large .mov/.mp4 in user temp/hidden dirs | DC0039 File Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
TCCAllowList | Legitimate apps (Zoom, Teams, FaceTime) that are permitted to camera. |
VideoExtensions | Mov/mp4/mkv/yuv etc., tuned to environment workloads. |
TimeWindow | Correlation between TCC grant → file write → network egress. |
MinFileSizeMB | Reduce FP from thumbnails/snapshots. |
LaunchAgentPaths | Allowed persistence paths to reduce false positives when correlating with persistence. |