kevmap

TechniquesT1566.001 › AN0655

AN0655 Analytic 0655

Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2

<p>Detection of spearphishing attachments by correlating suspicious email delivery with subsequent file creation and abnormal process execution (e.g., Office spawning PowerShell or CMD). Behavior chain includes inbound email metadata → attachment stored on disk → process execution → outbound network activity.</p>
Detects
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
Part of
DET0236 Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms

Log sources and channels

Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.

Log sourceChannelData component
m365:unifiedSend/Receive: Inbound emails with attachments from suspicious or spoofed sendersDC0038 Application Log Content
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11DC0039 File Creation
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1DC0032 Process Creation
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22DC0082 Network Connection Creation

Mutable elements

Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.

FieldDescription
AttachmentExtensionsList of high-risk extensions to monitor (e.g., .exe, .js, .vbs, .docm, .xlsm).
SuspiciousParentChildPairsProcess lineage patterns considered malicious (e.g., winword.exe → powershell.exe).
TimeWindowCorrelation window between email receipt, file creation, and process execution.

KEV CVEs whose mapped technique this analytic detects

CVEVendor / productState
CVE-2013-0640Adobe Reader and AcrobatMapped
CVE-2017-11292Adobe Flash PlayerMapped
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft OfficeMapped
CVE-2022-41033Microsoft Windows COM+ Event System ServiceMapped
CVE-2023-2868Barracuda Networks Email Security Gateway (ESG) ApplianceMapped
CVE-2025-04117-Zip 7-ZipMapped
CVE-2025-33053Microsoft WindowsMapped