Techniques › T1218.003 › AN0932
AN0932 Analytic 0932
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Execution of CMSTP.exe with arguments pointing to suspicious or remote INF/SCT/DLL payloads, optionally followed by outbound network connections to untrusted IPs, process injection via COM interfaces (CMSTPLUA, CMLUAUTIL), registry modifications registering malicious profiles, or creation of suspicious INF/DLL/SCT files prior to execution.</p>
- Detects
- T1218.003 CMSTP
- Part of
- DET0328 Detection of Malicious Profile Installation via CMSTP.exe
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:PowerShell | EventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106 | DC0064 Command Execution |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=3, 22 | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=10 | DC0035 Process Access |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=12 | DC0056 Windows Registry Key Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=13, 14 | DC0063 Windows Registry Key Modification |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 | DC0039 File Creation |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
INFPathRegex | Regex for identifying suspicious INF files; adjust to suppress known safe profiles |
ExternalIPAllowlist | Domains or IP ranges allowed for CMSTP network connections |
COMInterfaceGUIDs | Set of auto-elevated COM interface GUIDs to flag (e.g., CMSTPLUA, CMLUAUTIL) |
RegistryKeyAllowlist | Known good registry entries for CMSTP profile registration |
TimeWindow | Correlate CMSTP execution with subsequent network activity or process creation within N seconds |