Techniques › T1090.003 › AN1023
AN1023 Analytic 1023
ESXi · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Outbound encrypted traffic initiated from hypervisor shell or via VM backdoor mechanisms to relays in VPS infrastructure, especially if traversing multiple nodes before reaching Internet destination. Packet captures or firewall logs show non-VM communication paths.</p>
- Detects
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
- Part of
- DET0359 Multi-hop Proxy Behavior via Relay Node Chaining, Onion Routing, and Network Tunneling
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| esxi:esxupdate | /var/log/esxupdate.log or /var/log/vmksummary.log | DC0082 Network Connection Creation |
| esxi:vmkernel | /var/log/vmkernel.log | DC0078 Network Traffic Flow |
| NSM:Flow | Relay patterns across IP hops | DC0085 Network Traffic Content |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
HopCount | Threshold on number of IPs contacted in sequence without DNS resolution. |
ShellAccess | Flag if relay communication initiated by ESXi shell or unknown VM agent. |
VPSIPRange | Filter for known Tor/VPS egress networks. |