Techniques › T1671 › AN1487
AN1487 Analytic 1487
Office Suite · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Detects suspicious OAuth application integrations within Office 365 or Google Workspace environments, such as new app registrations, unexpected consent grants, or privilege assignments. Defenders should correlate between application creation/modification events and associated user or service principal activity to identify persistence via app integrations.</p>
- Detects
- T1671 Cloud Application Integration
- Part of
- DET0539 Detection Strategy for Cloud Application Integration
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| m365:unified | Add app role assignment grant to user: Consent to application by privileged or unexpected accounts | DC0066 Active Directory Object Modification |
| azure:audit | Consent to application: OAuth application consent granted to service principal | DC0069 Cloud Service Modification |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
PrivilegedUserList | Defines which accounts are authorized to consent or register applications; deviations indicate possible adversary persistence. |
ApplicationScopeThreshold | Defines which OAuth scopes are considered risky (e.g., Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All). |