Techniques › T1070 › T1070.009
T1070.009 Clear Persistence
stealth — ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1070.009
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence. Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).</p><p>In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0040 Detection of Persistence Artifact Removal Across Host Platforms v1.0
AN0113 WindowsDetects adversary activity that removes persistence artifacts such as services, registry keys, scheduled tasks, user accounts, and binaries through commands like
sc delete,schtasks /delete, orreg delete.Tunable:TargetRegistryPathRegexDeletedScheduledTaskNameDeletedAccountGroupScopeAN0114 LinuxDetects removal of persistence artifacts such as crontab entries, systemd service units, and malicious user accounts through commands likecrontab -r,rm /etc/systemd/system/*.service, oruserdel.Tunable:ServicePathMatchCronUserScopeUserDeletionActivityAN0115 macOSDetects deletion of launch agents (~/Library/LaunchAgents/) and launch daemons (/Library/LaunchDaemons/), especially after suspicious process execution or when tied to known persistence methods.Tunable:LaunchDaemonPathCorrelatedProcessImageAN0116 ESXiDetects adversary removal of persistence implants (e.g., rc.local entries or crontab injections) via CLI (rm,sed,crontab -r) and deletion of startup or management scripts.Tunable:ScriptRemovalPathStartupEntryClearance
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1070.009
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.
Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1070) 20
These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-09-02 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0649be4a-aeb0-45b0-b89e-7f1668f6d9c0
Detects attempts to delete Internet Information Services (IIS) log files via command line utilities, which is a common defense evasion technique used by attackers to cover their tracks.
Threat actors often abuse vulnerabilities in web applications hosted on IIS servers to gain initial access and later delete IIS logs to evade detection.
Author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-10-19 (modified 2023-02-08) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_delete · 07bdd2f5-9c58-4f38-aec8-e101bb79ef8d
Detects the deletion of registry keys containing the MSTSC connection history
Author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-08-27 (modified 2023-01-23) · logsource: product=windows service=msexchange-management · 09570ae5-889e-43ea-aac0-0e1221fb3d95
Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-06-28 (modified 2022-11-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 115fdba9-f017-42e6-84cf-d5573bf2ddf8
Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
Author: Janantha Marasinghe
· 2022-12-13 (modified 2022-12-28) · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · 20f754db-d025-4a8f-9d74-e0037e999a9a
Detects an instance of an SES identity being deleted via the "DeleteIdentity" event. This may be an indicator of an adversary removing the account that carried out suspicious or malicious activities
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-16 · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 270185ff-5f50-4d6d-a27f-24c3b8c9fef8
Detects the deletion of tomcat WebServer logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping)
· 2024-03-26 · logsource: product=kubernetes category=application service=audit · 3132570d-cab2-4561-9ea6-1743644b2290
Detects when events are deleted in Kubernetes.
An adversary may delete Kubernetes events in an attempt to evade detection.
Author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-09-16 (modified 2023-02-15) · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 3eb8c339-a765-48cc-a150-4364c04652bf
Detects the deletion of IIS WebServer access logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-13 (modified 2025-10-07) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 4931188c-178e-4ee7-a348-39e8a7a56821
Detect filter driver unloading activity via fltmc.exe
Author: Kirill Kiryanov, oscd.community
· 2019-10-23 (modified 2023-02-13) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8
Detects possible Sysmon filter driver unloaded via fltmc.exe
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-15 · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 63c779ba-f638-40a0-a593-ddd45e8b1ddc
Detects the deletion of the event log files which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Tuan Le (NCSGroup), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-03-09 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 95d61234-7f56-465c-6f2d-b562c6fedbc4
Detects linux package removal using builtin tools such as "yum", "apt", "apt-get" or "dpkg".
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-07-17 (modified 2023-09-18) · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c
Detects when a system process (i.e. located in system32, syswow64, etc.) loads a DLL from a suspicious location or a location with permissive permissions such as "C:\Users\Public"
Author: @neu5ron, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
· 2019-03-22 (modified 2022-06-28) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-26 (modified 2022-12-30) · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · a55349d8-9588-4c5a-8e3b-1925fe2a4ffe
Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Author: Ecco, E.M. Anhaus, oscd.community
· 2019-09-26 (modified 2023-09-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · add64136-62e5-48ea-807e-88638d02df1e
Detects suspicious parameters of fsutil (deleting USN journal, configuring it with small size, etc).
Might be used by ransomwares during the attack (seen by NotPetya and others).
Author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
· 2021-11-25 (modified 2022-12-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7
Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
· 2019-10-22 (modified 2022-11-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c947b146-0abc-4c87-9c64-b17e9d7274a2
Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities
Author: @neu5ron
· 2019-02-07 (modified 2023-02-15) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c9fbe8e9-119d-40a6-9b59-dd58a5d84429
Detects potential malicious and unauthorized usage of bcdedit.exe
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-02-15 · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · ff301988-c231-4bd0-834c-ac9d73b86586
Detects the deletion of the PowerShell console History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence