Techniques › T1558 › T1558.004
T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting
credential access — Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1558.004
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by Password Cracking Kerberos messages.</p><p>Preauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.</p><p>For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline Password Cracking attacks similarly to Kerberoasting and expose plaintext credentials.</p><p>An account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like PowerShell with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data.</p><p>Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0113 Detect AS-REP Roasting Attempts (T1558.004) v1.0
AN0316 WindowsDetects AS-REP roasting attempts by monitoring for Kerberos AS-REQ/AS-REP authentication patterns where preauthentication is disabled (Event ID 4768 with Pre-Auth Type 0). Correlates these requests with subsequent service ticket activity (Event ID 4769) and anomalies such as requests using weak RC4 encryption (etype 0x17). Excessive enumeration of accounts with 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set in Active Directory is another key detection point.Tunable:
PreAuthDisabledAccountsBaselineTGTRequestThresholdAllowedEncryptionTypesTimeWindow
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1558.004
No Sigma rule carries this tag. MITRE publishes a detection strategy above, so the behaviour is specified; what is missing is public detection content.
Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1558) 6
These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.
Author: frack113
· 2022-10-14 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 5a44727c-3b85-4713-8c44-4401d5499629
Detects possible Kerberos Replay Attack on the domain controllers when "KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT" Kerberos response is sent to the client
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
· 2018-09-09 (modified 2026-06-15) · logsource: category=antivirus · 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
Author: frack113
· 2022-10-14 (modified 2023-12-14) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 94309181-d345-4cbf-b5fe-061769bdf9cb
Detects logon with "Special groups" and "Special Privileges" can be thought of as Administrator groups or privileges.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE
· 2021-11-08 (modified 2024-06-27) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29
Detects the creation of files created by mimikatz such as ".kirbi", "mimilsa.log", etc.
Author: frack113
· 2025-03-05 · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5
Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation.
Author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
· 2019-10-24 (modified 2024-03-15) · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74
Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.