Techniques › T1546.015 › AN1323
AN1323 Analytic 1323
Windows · attack.mitre.org · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
<p>Correlate suspicious registry modifications to known COM object CLSIDs with subsequent DLL loads or unexpected binary execution paths. Detect placement of COM CLSID entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\ overriding default HKLM paths. Flag anomalous DLL loads traced back to hijacked COM registry changes.</p>
- Detects
- T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking
- Part of
- DET0481 Windows COM Hijacking Detection via Registry and DLL Load Correlation
Log sources and channels
Exactly as MITRE states them in x_mitre_log_source_references. Where a channel is vague, it is vague in the source; kevmap does not tidy it.
| Log source | Channel | Data component |
|---|---|---|
| WinEventLog:Security | EventCode=4657 | DC0063 Windows Registry Key Modification |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 | DC0032 Process Creation |
| WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=7 | DC0016 Module Load |
Mutable elements
Parameters MITRE marks as environment-specific. These are the knobs you are expected to tune; they are why an analytic is not a rule.
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
RegistryPathScope | Defenders may tune specific monitored CLSIDs depending on known-good application behavior. |
BinaryPathAnomalyThreshold | May require tuning based on environment to distinguish rare-but-legit COM DLLs vs suspicious ones. |
TimeWindow | Correlating registry changes to DLL load or process execution may require configurable time window. |
UserContextFilter | Tuning detection by isolating activity to specific user SIDs or admin-level activity may reduce false positives. |