kevmap

TechniquesT1546 › T1546.015

T1546.015 Component Object Model Hijacking

privilege escalation · persistence — Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON

1
MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
9
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1546.015
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.</p><p>Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.</p><p>One variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.</p>

KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer

None. No KEV entry in the public mapping names this technique. Given that 74.7% of KEV has no mapping at all, this says more about the mapping than about the technique.

Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2

Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1546.015

Author: BlackBerry Threat Research and Intelligence Team - @Joseliyo_Jstnk · 2023-06-07 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 243380fa-11eb-4141-af92-e14925e77c1b
Detects changes to the PSFactory COM InProcServer32 registry. This technique was used by RomCom to create persistence storing a malicious DLL.
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2024-07-16 (modified 2025-11-10) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 790317c0-0a36-4a6a-a105-6e576bf99a14
Detects potential COM object hijacking via modification of default system CLSID.
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: MSTIC, FPT.EagleEye · 2021-06-15 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 7ba08e95-1e0b-40cd-9db5-b980555e42fd
Suspicious behaviours related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as SOURGUM
Techniques: T1546T1546.015
Author: frack113 · 2022-04-02 · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 8bc063d5-3a3a-4f01-a140-bc15e55e8437
Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community · 2019-10-23 (modified 2025-10-26) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 9b0f8a61-91b2-464f-aceb-0527e0a45020
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: frack113 · 2022-08-28 (modified 2025-07-11) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · dc5c24af-6995-49b2-86eb-a9ff62199e82
Detect modification of TreatAs key to enable "rundll32.exe -sta" command
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: frack113 · 2022-07-27 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · df4dc653-1029-47ba-8231-3c44238cc0ae
Detects potential persistence using Appx DebugPath
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: frack113 · 2022-02-13 (modified 2023-02-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f1edd233-30b5-4823-9e6a-c4171b24d316
load malicious registered COM objects
Techniques: T1546.015
Author: frack113 · 2022-08-20 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · fe20dda1-6f37-4379-bbe0-a98d400cae90
Detect use of scrobj.dll as this DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute
Techniques: T1546.015

Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1546) 10

These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.

Author: Omkar Gudhate · 2020-09-27 (modified 2023-09-28) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 07743f65-7ec9-404a-a519-913db7118a8d
Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute'
Techniques: T1546T1548
Author: Kyaw Min Thein, Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_) · 2020-06-22 (modified 2023-10-11) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0ba863e6-def5-4e50-9cea-4dd8c7dc46a4
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
Techniques: T1218.002T1546
Author: frack113 · 2022-04-23 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 0c3fac91-5627-46e8-a6a8-a0d7b9b8ae1b
Get-Variable is a valid PowerShell cmdlet WindowsApps is by default in the path where PowerShell is executed. So when the Get-Variable command is issued on PowerShell execution, the system first looks for the Get-Variable executable in the path and executes the malicious binary instead of looking for the PowerShell cmdlet.
Techniques: T1546T1027
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2023-02-08 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 117d3d3a-755c-4a61-b23e-9171146d094c
Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
Techniques: T1137T1008T1546
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) · 2021-04-05 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · 396ae3eb-4174-4b9b-880e-dc0364d78a19
Detects the modification of Outlook setting "LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" which if enabled allows the automatic loading of any configured VBA project/module
Techniques: T1137T1008T1546
Author: Denis Szadkowski, DIRT / DCSO CyTec · 2022-10-09 · logsource: product=windows service=application · 711ab2fe-c9ba-4746-8840-5228a58c3cb8
This rule detects the execution of the extended storage procedure backdoor named Maggie in the context of Microsoft SQL server
Techniques: T1546
Author: MSTIC, FPT.EagleEye · 2021-06-15 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 7ba08e95-1e0b-40cd-9db5-b980555e42fd
Suspicious behaviours related to an actor tracked by Microsoft as SOURGUM
Techniques: T1546T1546.015
Author: @ScoubiMtl · 2021-04-05 (modified 2023-02-08) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 8c31f563-f9a7-450c-bfa8-35f8f32f1f61
Detects the creation of a macro file for Outlook.
Techniques: T1137T1008T1546
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · 2021-03-09 (modified 2023-03-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7
Detects activity observed by different researchers to be HAFNIUM group activity (or related) on Exchange servers
Techniques: T1546T1053
Author: @ScoubiMtl · 2021-04-05 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · e3b50fa5-3c3f-444e-937b-0a99d33731cd
Detects the modification of Outlook security setting to allow unprompted execution of macros.
Techniques: T1137T1008T1546