Coverage › CVE-2023-27532
CVE-2023-27532 Mapped Sigma
Veeam Backup & Replication Cloud Connect Missing Authentication for Critical Function Vulnerability
- Vendor / product
- Veeam — Backup & Replication
- Description (CISA)
- Veeam Backup & Replication Cloud Connect component contains a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated user operating within the backup infrastructure network perimeter to obtain encrypted credentials stored in the configuration database. This may lead to an attacker gaining access to the backup infrastructure hosts.
- Added to KEV
- 2023-08-22
- Due date
- 2023-09-12
- Required action
- Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
- Known ransomware use
- Known
- CWE
- CWE-306
- CISA notes
- https://www.veeam.com/kb4424
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27532 - Elsewhere
- cve.org · NVD · CISA KEV · JSON
ATT&CK techniques · CTID Mappings Explorer, ATT&CK 16.1, KEV snapshot 2025-07-28
6 mapping objects across 6 techniques. exploitation technique states how the vulnerability is exploited; primary and secondary impact state what exploitation achieves. They are different claims and are labelled as such.
| Technique | Mapping type | CTID comment | Status in v19.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1133 External Remote Services | exploitation technique | CVE-2023-27532 is a vulnerability in their backup & replication servers exposed online which allows unauthenticated users to request encrypted credentials. Public reporting has indicated that various ransomware groups have exploited vulnerability to gain access and crash the backup infrastructure hosts, extract stored encrypted credentials, and deploy additional tools. ref 1 · ref 2 · ref 3 |
live |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell | primary impact | CVE-2023-27532 is a vulnerability in their backup & replication servers exposed online which allows unauthenticated users to request encrypted credentials. Public reporting has indicated that various ransomware groups have exploited vulnerability to gain access and crash the backup infrastructure hosts, extract stored encrypted credentials, and deploy additional tools. ref 1 · ref 2 · ref 3 |
live |
| T1087 Account Discovery | secondary impact | CVE-2023-27532 is a vulnerability in their backup & replication servers exposed online which allows unauthenticated users to request encrypted credentials. Public reporting has indicated that various ransomware groups have exploited vulnerability to gain access and crash the backup infrastructure hosts, extract stored encrypted credentials, and deploy additional tools. ref 1 · ref 2 · ref 3 |
live |
| T1087.001 Local Account | secondary impact | CVE-2023-27532 is a vulnerability in their backup & replication servers exposed online which allows unauthenticated users to request encrypted credentials. Public reporting has indicated that various ransomware groups have exploited vulnerability to gain access and crash the backup infrastructure hosts, extract stored encrypted credentials, and deploy additional tools. ref 1 · ref 2 · ref 3 |
live |
| T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact | secondary impact | CVE-2023-27532 is a vulnerability in their backup & replication servers exposed online which allows unauthenticated users to request encrypted credentials. Public reporting has indicated that various ransomware groups have exploited vulnerability to gain access and crash the backup infrastructure hosts, extract stored encrypted credentials, and deploy additional tools. ref 1 · ref 2 · ref 3 |
live |
| T1555 Credentials from Password Stores | secondary impact | CVE-2023-27532 is a vulnerability in their backup & replication servers exposed online which allows unauthenticated users to request encrypted credentials. Public reporting has indicated that various ransomware groups have exploited vulnerability to gain access and crash the backup infrastructure hosts, extract stored encrypted credentials, and deploy additional tools. ref 1 · ref 2 · ref 3 |
live |
Detection chain · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2 detection strategies, analytics, log sources
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell primary impact
- DET0202 Behavioral Detection of Windows Command Shell Execution
AN0578 WindowsDetects interactive or scripted abuse of cmd.exe, batch files, or shell invocation chains. Focuses on parent-child relationships (e.g., cmd.exe launched from unusual parents), anomalous command-line parameters, and chaining with discovery, credential access, or lateral movement behaviors.Tunable:
ParentProcessNameTimeWindowCommandLinePatternScriptStoragePathUserContext
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1059.003 (46)
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2024-07-23 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 00ca75ab-d5ce-43be-b86c-55ff39c6abfc
Detects the launch of a child process via "conhost.exe" with the "--headless" flag.
The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-10-24 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 023394c4-29d5-46ab-92b8-6a534c6f447b
Detects suspicious Hangul Word Processor (Hanword) sub processes that could indicate an exploitation
Author: Matt Anderson (Huntress)
· 2024-07-23 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 056c7317-9a09-4bd4-9067-d051312752ea
Detects the use of powershell commands from headless ConHost window.
The "--headless" flag hides the windows from the user upon execution.
Author: Thomas Patzke
· 2020-05-22 (modified 2023-11-06) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
Author: Ali Alwashali
· 2023-10-10 · logsource: product=windows service=application · 076ebe48-cc05-4d8f-9d41-89245cd93a14
Detects command execution via ScreenConnect RMM
Author: xknow @xknow_infosec, Tim Shelton
· 2020-06-11 (modified 2023-03-06) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 087790e3-3287-436c-bccf-cbd0184a7db1
Detects potential path traversal attempt via cmd.exe. Could indicate possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
Author: Jose Luis Sanchez Martinez (@Joseliyo_Jstnk)
· 2022-05-24 (modified 2023-02-22) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0a99eb3e-1617-41bd-b095-13dc767f3def
Detects the use of Jlaive to execute assemblies in a copied PowerShell
Author: Ali Alwashali
· 2023-10-10 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 0afecb6e-6223-4a82-99fb-bf5b981e92a5
Detects the creation of files in a specific location by ScreenConnect RMM.
ScreenConnect has feature to remotely execute binaries on a target machine. These binaries will be dropped to ":\Users\<username>\Documents\ConnectWiseControl\Temp\" before execution.
Author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-04-04 (modified 2023-04-22) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0e9e6c63-1350-48c4-9fa1-7ccb235edc68
Detects Rorschach ransomware execution activity
Author: Nisarg Suthar
· 2025-08-01 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0fdc7c7f-c690-4217-9ae3-31f5156eed72
Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP. It could be an indication of exploitation of a RCE vulnerability such as CVE-2025-54309.
Author: faloker
· 2020-02-12 (modified 2022-06-07) · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df
Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community
· 2019-01-16 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1ac8666b-046f-4201-8aba-1951aaec03a3
Detects a suspicious command line execution that includes an URL and AppData string in the command line parameters as used by several droppers (js/vbs > powershell)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
· 2019-11-15 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1c373b6d-76ce-4553-997d-8c1da9a6b5f5
Detects exploitation attempt of privilege escalation vulnerability via SetupComplete.cmd and PartnerSetupComplete.cmd described in CVE-2019-1378
Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-03-07 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 241e802a-b65e-484f-88cd-c2dc10f9206d
Detect the use of "<" to read and potentially execute a file via cmd.exe
Author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
· 2025-11-12 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 2782fbd8-b662-4eb5-9962-5bfbfb671e7b
Detects suspicious usage of the cmd.exe 'for /f' loop combined with the 'tokens=' parameter and a recursive directory listing.
This pattern may indicate an attempt to discover and execute system binaries dynamically, for example powershell, a technique sometimes used by attackers to evade detection.
This behavior has been observed in various malicious lnk files.
All 46 rules on the technique page →
T1087 Account Discovery secondary impact
- DET0587 Enumeration of User or Account Information Across Platforms
AN1612 WindowsDetection of processes performing local or domain account enumeration by invoking account directory queries or security APIs followed by structured output of account lists. The defender observes command execution or API invocation patterns that retrieve account information and produce enumeration artifacts shortly afterward.Tunable:
CommandLinePatternTimeWindowUserContextAN1613 LinuxEnumeration of users and groups through suspicious shell commands or unauthorized access to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow.Tunable:AccessedFileParentProcessNameAN1614 macOSDetection of account enumeration through directory service queries or system utilities accessing account metadata stores, followed by structured enumeration output.macos:unifiedlogDirectoryService queries retrieving account information→ DC0013 User Account MetadataTunable:CommandLineExecutionContextAN1615 IaaSDetection of enumeration of identity entities through cloud provider APIs where principals retrieve account metadata such as IAM users or roles in rapid succession.Tunable:API_MethodCallerTypeAN1616 Identity ProviderDetection of identity directory enumeration through API calls or administrative queries retrieving multiple account objects within a short interval.Tunable:QueryTypeAppContextAN1617 ESXiDetection of enumeration activity when system processes query ESXi host account configuration or management APIs to retrieve user account listings.Tunable:CommandPatternPrivilegedSessionAN1618 SaaSAccount enumeration via bulk access to user directory features or hidden APIs.Tunable:EndpointURLUserAgentAN1619 Office SuiteAccount discovery via VBA macros, COM objects, or embedded scripting.Tunable:MacroNameExecutionScope
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1087 (16)
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-02 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-05-31 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-18 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-03-17 (modified 2023-11-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9
Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system
Author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
· 2022-01-01 · logsource: product=rpc_firewall category=application · 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5
Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
Author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
· 2023-10-27 (modified 2024-01-26) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 698d4431-514f-4c82-af4d-cf573872a9f5
Detects system discovery activity carried out by Pikabot, such as incl. network, user info and domain groups.
The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique as part of its C2-botnet registration with a short collection time frame (less than 1 minute).
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-20 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_module · 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Sean Metcalf, Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton, Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein, Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski, Austin Songer
· 2017-03-05 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
· 2022-09-19 (modified 2023-03-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-12-18 (modified 2026-06-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · aae1243f-d8af-40d8-ab20-33fc6d0c55bc
Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery or delete events logs
Author: @kostastsale
· 2024-01-26 · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · b3ad3c0f-c949-47a1-a30e-b0491ccae876
Detects uncommon network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) from processes not typically associated with ADWS management.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-09-09 (modified 2025-12-02) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
· 2017-01-01 (modified 2026-07-14) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c
Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-02-07 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
Author: @kostastsale
· 2024-01-26 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
All 16 rules on the technique page →
T1087.001 Local Account secondary impact
- DET0303 Local Account Enumeration Across Host Platforms
AN0846 WindowsAdversary enumeration of local user accounts using Net.exe, WMI, or PowerShell.Tunable:
CommandLinePatternUserContextTimeWindowAN0847 LinuxEnumeration of local users or groups via file access (/etc/passwd) or commands like id, groups.Tunable:AccessedFileExecutionScopeAN0848 macOSEnumeration of macOS local users using dscl, id, dscacheutil, or /etc/passwd access.Tunable:CommandLineInteractiveSessionAN0849 ESXiEnumeration of local ESXi accounts using esxcli or vSphere API from unauthorized sessions.Tunable:CommandPatternSessionType
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1087.001 (13)
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-02 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: C.J. May
· 2022-08-09 (modified 2026-02-19) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 02773bed-83bf-469f-b7ff-e676e7d78bab
Detects default file names outputted by the BloodHound collection tool SharpHound
Author: Michael Haag, Mark Woan (improvements), James Pemberton / @4A616D6573 / oscd.community (improvements)
· 2019-01-16 (modified 2022-07-11) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 183e7ea8-ac4b-4c23-9aec-b3dac4e401ac
Detects execution of "Net.EXE".
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
· 2019-10-21 (modified 2025-10-20) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 502b42de-4306-40b4-9596-6f590c81f073
Local accounts, System Owner/User discovery using operating systems utilities
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-20 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_module · 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Sean Metcalf, Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton, Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein, Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski, Austin Songer
· 2017-03-05 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-12-18 (modified 2026-06-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · aae1243f-d8af-40d8-ab20-33fc6d0c55bc
Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery or delete events logs
Author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community, CheraghiMilad
· 2020-10-08 (modified 2024-12-10) · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · b45e3d6f-42c6-47d8-a478-df6bd6cf534c
Detects enumeration of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-10 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · c8a180d6-47a3-4345-a609-53f9c3d834fc
Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using the PowerShell Get-LocalGroupMember Cmdlet
Author: Austin Clark
· 2019-08-11 (modified 2023-01-04) · logsource: product=cisco service=aaa · cd072b25-a418-4f98-8ebc-5093fb38fe1a
Collect pertinent data from the configuration files
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-01-16 (modified 2023-03-02) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0
Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE
Check if the user that executed the commands is suspicious (e.g. service accounts, LOCAL_SYSTEM)
Author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community
· 2020-10-08 (modified 2026-07-07) · logsource: product=macos category=process_creation · ddf36b67-e872-4507-ab2e-46bda21b842c
Detects enumeration of local system accounts on MacOS systems.
This can be used by attackers to identify accounts for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-12-20 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f376c8a7-a2d0-4ddc-aa0c-16c17236d962
Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools
T1133 External Remote Services exploitation technique
- DET0354 Behavior-chain detection for T1133 External Remote Services across Windows, Linux, macOS, Containers
AN1004 WindowsUnusual or unauthorized external remote access attempts (e.g., RDP, VPN, Citrix) → repeated failed logins followed by a successful session from uncommon geolocations or outside business hours → subsequent internal lateral movement or data exfiltration activities.WinEventLog:Application
VPN, Citrix, or remote access gateway logs showing external IP addresses→ DC0038 Application Log ContentTunable:BusinessHoursKnownRemoteIPsFailedLogonThresholdGeoIPWhitelistTimeWindowAN1005 LinuxRepeated SSH, VPN, or RDP gateway authentication attempts from external IPs → subsequent successful logon → remote shell or lateral movement activity (e.g., scp/sftp).Tunable:KnownSSHClientsFailedLogonThresholdTimeWindowAN1006 macOSUnexpected inbound or outbound VNC/SSH/Screen Sharing connections from external sources → repeated failed logins followed by success → remote interactive sessions or abnormal file transfers.macos:unifiedlogRemote login (ssh) or screen sharing authentication attempts→ DC0088 Logon Session MetadataTunable:KnownVNCServersTimeWindowAN1007 ContainersConnections to exposed container services (e.g., Docker API, Kubernetes API server) from unauthorized external IPs → abnormal container creation/start → lateral activity within cluster nodes.ApplicationLog:APIDocker/Kubernetes API access from external sources→ DC0038 Application Log Contentkubernetes:auditUnauthorized container creation or kubelet exec logs→ DC0088 Logon Session MetadataTunable:AllowedCIDRsTimeWindow
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1133 (20)
Author: Josh Nickels, Qi Nan
· 2024-03-11 · logsource: product=linux category=process_creation · 1f6b8cd4-3e60-47cc-b282-5aa1cbc9182d
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
· 2023-01-19 (modified 2024-03-11) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2
Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.
Author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
· 2025-11-01 · logsource: product=fortigate service=event · 2bfb6216-0c31-4d20-8501-2629b29a3fa2
Detects the addition of a VPN SSL Web Portal on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.
This behavior was observed in pair with modification of VPN SSL settings.
Author: Security Onion Solutions
· 2024-03-08 · logsource: product=opencanary category=application · 512cff7a-683a-43ad-afe0-dd398e872f36
Detects instances where a Telnet service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.
Author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM)
· 2026-01-06 · logsource: product=opencanary category=application · 598290cf-5932-45cd-9123-be1e05ab4f2e
Detects instances where an RDP service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
Author: MSFT (idea), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-10-07 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 6c76b3d0-afe4-4870-9443-ffe6773c5fef
Detects suspicious command execution by child processes of the GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer (MFT) application, which may indicate exploitation such as CVE-2025-10035.
This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2025-10035, as observed in campaigns by the threat actor Storm-1175.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-02-11 (modified 2024-02-26) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 75bfe6e6-cd8e-429e-91d3-03921e1d7962
Detects ScreenConnect program starts that establish a remote access to a system.
Author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity)
· 2023-01-19 (modified 2024-03-11) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc
Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
Author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber)
· 2025-11-01 · logsource: product=fortigate service=event · 8b5dacf2-aeb7-459d-b133-678eb696d410
Detects the modification of VPN SSL Settings (for example, the modification of authentication rules).
This behavior was observed in pair with the addition of a VPN SSL Web Portal.
Author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
· 2022-09-27 (modified 2023-02-15) · logsource: product=windows category=file_delete · 8f0b1fb1-9bd4-4e74-8cdf-a8de4d2adfd0
Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea)
· 2022-09-27 · logsource: product=windows category=file_change · 9f383dc0-fdeb-4d56-acbc-9f9f4f8f20f3
Detects an unexpected file being modified by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea)
· 2022-09-27 (modified 2023-02-05) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · a4e3d776-f12e-42c2-8510-9e6ed1f43ec3
Detects an unexpected process spawning from dns.exe which may indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
Author: Josh Nickels, Qi Nan
· 2024-03-11 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · ab70c354-d9ac-4e11-bbb6-ec8e3b153357
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host.
Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Author: frack113
· 2021-12-28 (modified 2023-08-17) · logsource: product=windows category=registry_set · b64a026b-8deb-4c1d-92fd-98893209dff1
Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension
Author: Security Onion Solutions
· 2024-03-08 · logsource: product=opencanary category=application · cd55f721-5623-4663-bd9b-5229cab5237d
Detects instances where an SSH service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.
All 20 rules on the technique page →
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact secondary impact
- DET0215 Detection of Multi-Platform File Encryption for Impact
AN0602 WindowsHigh-frequency file write operations using uncommon extensions, followed by ransom note creation, registry tampering, or shadow copy deletion. Often uses CLI tools like vssadmin, wbadmin, cipher, or PowerShell.Tunable:
FileExtensionTargetFolderTimeWindowCommandLineAN0603 LinuxEncryption via custom or open-source tools (e.g., openssl, gpg, aescrypt) recursively targeting user or system directories. Also includes overwrite of existing data and ransom note drops.Tunable:FilenamePatternSyscallBurstRateDirectoryTargetedAN0604 macOSUserland or kernel-level ransomware encrypting user files (Documents, Desktop) usingsrm,gpg, or compiled payloads. Often correlated with ransom note creation in multiple directories.macos:unifiedlogfile encrypted|new file with .encrypted extension|disk write burst→ DC0061 File ModificationTunable:ExtensionPatternVolumeTargetedAN0605 ESXiRansomware encrypts .vmdk, .vmx, .log, or VM config files in VMFS datastores. May rename to .locked or delete/overwrite with encrypted versions. Often correlates with shell commands run throughdcui, SSH, or vSphere.Tunable:FileTypeUserContextAN0606 IaaSEncryption of cloud storage objects (e.g., S3 buckets) via Server-Side Encryption (SSE-C) or by replacing objects with encrypted variants. May include API patterns like PutObject with SSE-C headers.Tunable:SSEHeaderAffectedBucketUserAgent
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1486 (16)
Author: frack113
· 2021-11-15 (modified 2022-09-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5
Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility
Author: toopricey
· 2025-10-18 · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · 1279262f-1464-422f-ac0d-5b545320c526
Detects the import or deletion of key material in AWS KMS, which can be used as part of ransomware attacks. This activity is uncommon and provides a high certainty signal.
Author: Sittikorn S
· 2021-06-29 (modified 2021-08-20) · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · 16124c2d-e40b-4fcc-8f2c-5ab7870a2223
Identifies disabling of default Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption in the current region.
Disabling default encryption does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes.
Author: Saiprashanth Pulisetti ( @Prashanthblogs)
· 2025-08-08 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 2c76a22b-702d-48fd-8fa9-e41e2fe203b3
Detects the creation of files with the ".funksec" extension, which is appended to encrypted files by the FunkLocker ransomware.
Author: Luc Génaux
· 2023-11-28 (modified 2026-07-28) · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61
Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by an uncommon process.
This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows.
It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
· 2019-01-16 (modified 2025-10-18) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 41d40bff-377a-43e2-8e1b-2e543069e079
Detects WannaCry ransomware activity
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
· 2022-05-12 (modified 2026-06-15) · logsource: category=antivirus · 4c6ca276-d4d0-4a8c-9e4c-d69832f8671f
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
Author: frack113
· 2021-10-12 (modified 2023-02-13) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 689308fc-cfba-4f72-9897-796c1dc61487
Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
Author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
· 2020-10-18 (modified 2023-02-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068
Detects LockerGoga ransomware activity via specific command line.
Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-08-06 (modified 2023-11-10) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 77df53a5-1d78-4f32-bc5a-0e7465bd8f41
Detects the execution of "gpg.exe" from uncommon location. Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.
Author: Luc Génaux
· 2023-11-28 · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8
Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process.
This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows.
It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes.
Author: austinsonger
· 2021-08-19 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=m365 service=threat_management · bd132164-884a-48f1-aa2d-c6d646b04c69
Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user uploads files to the cloud that might be infected with ransomware.
Author: frack113
· 2021-12-26 (modified 2026-01-09) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · caf02a0a-1e1c-4552-9b48-5e070bd88d11
Detects creation of .txt files in user desktop folders via cmd.exe. This behavior may indicate ransomware deploying ransom notes, but can also occur during legitimate administrative tasks.
Analysts should investigate for suspicious filenames (e.g., "RANSOM", "DECRYPT", "READ_ME"), bulk file creation patterns, or concurrent encryption activity to determine if this is part of a ransomware attack.
Author: frack113
· 2022-07-16 (modified 2023-11-11) · logsource: product=windows category=file_rename · e3f673b3-65d1-4d80-9146-466f8b63fa99
Detects file renames where the target filename uses an uncommon double extension. Could indicate potential ransomware activity renaming files and adding a custom extension to the encrypted files, such as ".jpg.crypted", ".docx.locky", etc.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
· 2023-08-09 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · ec0722a3-eb5c-4a56-8ab2-bf6f20708592
Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.
All 16 rules on the technique page →
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores secondary impact
- DET0430 Detect Credentials Access from Password Stores
AN1198 WindowsMonitors suspicious access to password stores such as LSASS, DPAPI, Windows Credential Manager, or browser credential databases. Detects anomalous process-to-process access (e.g., Mimikatz accessing LSASS) and correlation of credential store file reads with execution of non-standard processes.Tunable:
TargetProcessesKeywordPatternsAN1199 LinuxDetects access to known password store files (e.g., /etc/shadow, GNOME Keyring, KWallet, browser credential databases). Monitors anomalous process read attempts and suspicious API calls that attempt to extract stored credentials.Tunable:MonitoredFilesSuspiciousCommandsAN1200 macOSMonitors Keychain database access and suspicious invocations of security and osascript utilities. Correlates process execution with attempts to dump or unlock Keychain data.Tunable:AllowedApplicationsAlertThresholdAN1201 IaaSDetects attempts to access or enumerate cloud password/secrets storage services such as AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or GCP Secret Manager. Monitors API calls for abnormal enumeration or bulk retrieval of secrets.Tunable:UserContextAccessThreshold
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1555 (8)
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-07-14 (modified 2022-07-14) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 58f4ea09-0fc2-4520-ba18-b85c540b0eaf
Detects a suspicious process pattern which could be a sign of an exploited Serv-U service
Author: frack113
· 2021-12-20 (modified 2022-12-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 603c6630-5225-49c1-8047-26c964553e0e
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.
Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2018-12-19 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 7679d464-4f74-45e2-9e01-ac66c5eb041a
Detects the execution of SecurityXploded Tools
Author: Nounou Mbeiri, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2024-06-26 · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 7892ec59-c5bb-496d-8968-e5d210ca3ac4
Detects file names with specific patterns seen generated and used by tools such as Mimikatz and DSInternals related to exported or stolen DPAPI backup keys and certificates.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
· 2023-12-04 · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a
Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
Author: frack113
· 2021-12-20 (modified 2022-12-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 99c49d9c-34ea-45f7-84a7-4751ae6b2cbc
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.
Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-10-21 · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · a840e606-7c8c-4684-9bc1-eb6b6155127f
Detects the execution of TruffleHog, a popular open-source tool used for scanning repositories for secrets and sensitive information, within an AWS environment.
It has been reported to be used by threat actors for credential harvesting. All detections should be investigated to determine if the usage is authorized by security teams or potentially malicious.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
· 2023-12-04 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.