Coverage › CVE-2024-13161
CVE-2024-13161 Mapped Sigma
Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) Absolute Path Traversal Vulnerability
- Vendor / product
- Ivanti — Endpoint Manager (EPM)
- Description (CISA)
- Ivanti Endpoint Manager (EPM) contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability that allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak sensitive information.
- Added to KEV
- 2025-03-10
- Due date
- 2025-03-31
- Required action
- Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
- Known ransomware use
- Unknown
- CWE
- CWE-36
- CISA notes
- https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-January-2025-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022-SU6?language=en_US
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13161 - Elsewhere
- cve.org · NVD · CISA KEV · JSON
ATT&CK techniques · CTID Mappings Explorer, ATT&CK 16.1, KEV snapshot 2025-07-28
4 mapping objects across 4 techniques. exploitation technique states how the vulnerability is exploited; primary and secondary impact state what exploitation achieves. They are different claims and are labelled as such.
| Technique | Mapping type | CTID comment | Status in v19.2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | exploitation technique | An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to coerce credential relay attacks and gain access to sensitive information. ref 1 |
live |
| T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | exploitation technique | An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to coerce credential relay attacks and gain access to sensitive information. ref 1 |
live |
| T1087 Account Discovery | secondary impact | An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to coerce credential relay attacks and gain access to sensitive information. ref 1 |
live |
| T1550.002 Pass the Hash | primary impact | An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to coerce credential relay attacks and gain access to sensitive information. ref 1 |
live |
Detection chain · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2 detection strategies, analytics, log sources
T1087 Account Discovery secondary impact
- DET0587 Enumeration of User or Account Information Across Platforms
AN1612 WindowsDetection of processes performing local or domain account enumeration by invoking account directory queries or security APIs followed by structured output of account lists. The defender observes command execution or API invocation patterns that retrieve account information and produce enumeration artifacts shortly afterward.Tunable:
CommandLinePatternTimeWindowUserContextAN1613 LinuxEnumeration of users and groups through suspicious shell commands or unauthorized access to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow.Tunable:AccessedFileParentProcessNameAN1614 macOSDetection of account enumeration through directory service queries or system utilities accessing account metadata stores, followed by structured enumeration output.macos:unifiedlogDirectoryService queries retrieving account information→ DC0013 User Account MetadataTunable:CommandLineExecutionContextAN1615 IaaSDetection of enumeration of identity entities through cloud provider APIs where principals retrieve account metadata such as IAM users or roles in rapid succession.Tunable:API_MethodCallerTypeAN1616 Identity ProviderDetection of identity directory enumeration through API calls or administrative queries retrieving multiple account objects within a short interval.Tunable:QueryTypeAppContextAN1617 ESXiDetection of enumeration activity when system processes query ESXi host account configuration or management APIs to retrieve user account listings.Tunable:CommandPatternPrivilegedSessionAN1618 SaaSAccount enumeration via bulk access to user directory features or hidden APIs.Tunable:EndpointURLUserAgentAN1619 Office SuiteAccount discovery via VBA macros, COM objects, or embedded scripting.Tunable:MacroNameExecutionScope
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1087 (16)
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-02 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-05-31 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-18 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da
Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-03-17 (modified 2023-11-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9
Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system
Author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz
· 2022-01-01 · logsource: product=rpc_firewall category=application · 65f77b1e-8e79-45bf-bb67-5988a8ce45a5
Detects remote RPC calls useb by SharpHound to map remote connections and local group membership.
Author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
· 2023-10-27 (modified 2024-01-26) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 698d4431-514f-4c82-af4d-cf573872a9f5
Detects system discovery activity carried out by Pikabot, such as incl. network, user info and domain groups.
The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique as part of its C2-botnet registration with a short collection time frame (less than 1 minute).
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-01-20 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_module · 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Sean Metcalf, Florian Roth, Bartlomiej Czyz @bczyz1, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Tim Shelton, Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein, Max Altgelt, Tobias Michalski, Austin Songer
· 2017-03-05 (modified 2025-12-10) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Author: Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure])
· 2022-09-19 (modified 2023-03-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 98b53e78-ebaf-46f8-be06-421aafd176d9
WinPEAS is a script that search for possible paths to escalate privileges on Windows hosts. The checks are explained on book.hacktricks.xyz
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-12-18 (modified 2026-06-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · aae1243f-d8af-40d8-ab20-33fc6d0c55bc
Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery or delete events logs
Author: @kostastsale
· 2024-01-26 · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · b3ad3c0f-c949-47a1-a30e-b0491ccae876
Detects uncommon network connections to the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) from processes not typically associated with ADWS management.
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-09-09 (modified 2025-12-02) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson
· 2017-01-01 (modified 2026-07-14) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c
Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-02-07 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e6313acd-208c-44fc-a0ff-db85d572e90e
Detects a set of suspicious network related commands often used in recon stages
Author: @kostastsale
· 2024-01-26 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e92a4287-e072-4a40-9739-370c106bb750
Detects the execution of SOAPHound, a .NET tool for collecting Active Directory data, using specific command-line arguments that may indicate an attempt to extract sensitive AD information.
All 16 rules on the technique page →
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application exploitation technique
- DET0080 Exploit Public-Facing Application – multi-signal correlation (request → error → post-exploit process/egress)
AN0219 WindowsAdversary sends crafted HTTP/S (or other service) input to an Internet-facing app (IIS/ASP.NET, API, device portal). Chain: (1) abnormal request patterns to public endpoint → (2) elevated 4xx/5xx or unusual methods/paths → (3) server process (w3wp.exe/other service) spawns shell/LOLbins or loads non-standard modules → (4) optional outbound callback from the host/container.ApplicationLog:IIS
IIS W3C logs in C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC* (spikes in 5xx, RCE/SQLi/path traversal/JNDI patterns)→ DC0038 Application Log ContentTunable:PublicVIPsSuspiciousPatternsErrorRateThresholdTimeWindowAllowedChildListAN0220 LinuxAdversary exploits Apache/Nginx/app servers. Chain: (1) suspicious requests in access logs → (2) spike of 5xx or WAF blocks → (3) web server or interpreter (apache2/nginx/php-fpm/node/python) spawns /bin/sh, curl, wget, socat, or writes webshell → (4) outbound callback.ApplicationLog:WebServer/var/log/httpd/access_log, /var/log/apache2/access.log, /var/log/nginx/access.log with exploit indicators and burst errors→ DC0038 Application Log ContentNSM:FlowHTTP payloads with SQLi/LFI/JNDI/deserialization indicators→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:WebProcListChildToolListBurstThresholdTimeWindowAN0221 macOSAdversary targets macOS-hosted public services (e.g., nginx, node). Chain: suspicious inbound request → service crash/5xx → service spawns shell or writes file → new outbound connection.macos:unifiedlogApp/web server logs ingested via unified logging or filebeat (nginx/apache/node).→ DC0038 Application Log ContentTunable:ServiceListTimeWindowAN0222 ContainersAdversary exploits containerized app via ingress or service. Chain: (1) suspicious request in ingress/app logs → (2) container process spawns a shell/exec/sidecar (kubectl exec/docker exec) → (3) egress to Internet or metadata service (169.254.169.254).ApplicationLog:IngressKubernetes NGINX/Envoy ingress controller logs with anomalous payloads and 5xx spikes→ DC0038 Application Log Contentdocker:eventsDocker/Kubernetes audit of exec/attach (kubectl exec) or unexpected child processes inside container→ DC0032 Process CreationNSM:FlowRequests towards cloud metadata or command & control from pod IPs→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:IngressNamespacesMetadataEndpointsTimeWindowAN0223 IaaSAdversary targets cloud-hosted public endpoints. Chain: (1) ALB/ELB/Cloud LB logs show exploit-like inputs or error spikes → (2) workload spawns shell or reaches metadata API → (3) egress to new external hosts.ALB:HTTPLogsAWS ALB/ELB/GCP/Azure Application Gateway HTTP logs with unusual methods, long URIs, serialized payloads, 4xx/5xx bursts→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentAWS:VPCFlowLogsVPC/NSG flow logs for pod/instance egress to Internet or metadata→ DC0078 Network Traffic FlowTunable:LBProjectsErrorBurstAN0224 ESXiAdversary exploits exposed OpenSLP on ESXi or vCenter public endpoints. Chain: inbound request pattern to mgmt service → hostd/vpxd error/crash/restart → unexpected process behavior or datastore access → outbound callback.esxi:hostd/var/log/hostd.log anomalies (faults, crashes, restarts) around inbound connections→ DC0038 Application Log ContentNSM:FlowConnections to TCP 427 (SLP) or vCenter web services from untrusted sources→ DC0085 Network Traffic ContentTunable:MgmtCIDRTimeWindowAN0225 Network DevicesAdversary exploits public admin services on routers/firewalls/switches. Chain: anomalous HTTP/SNMP/SmartInstall inputs → device syslog errors/restarts → config changes/CLI spawn → egress to attacker C2.networkdevice:controlplaneSyslog from edge devices with HTTP 500s on mgmt portal, SmartInstall events, unexpected CLI commands→ DC0038 Application Log ContentTunable:MgmtPortsTrustedAdmins
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1190 (149)
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-05-30 · logsource: category=webserver · 043c1609-0e32-4462-a6f2-5a0c2da3fafe
Detects a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-25717 a Remote Code Execution via an unauthenticated HTTP GET Request, in Ruckus Wireless Admin
Author: @gott_cyber
· 2022-12-11 (modified 2023-03-24) · logsource: category=webserver · 0bbcd74b-0596-41a4-94a0-4e88a76ffdb3
Detects exploitation attempt of the CVE-2021-27905 which affects all Apache Solr versions prior to and including 8.8.1.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2020-07-10 (modified 2023-01-02) · logsource: category=webserver · 0d0d9a8a-a49e-4e27-b061-7ce4b936cfb7
Detects exploitation attempt against Citrix Netscaler, Application Delivery Controller (ADS) and Citrix Gateway exploiting vulnerabilities reported as CVE-2020-8193 and CVE-2020-8195
Author: Thomas Patzke
· 2017-08-06 (modified 2020-09-01) · logsource: product=ruby_on_rails category=application · 0d2c3d4c-4b48-4ac3-8f23-ea845746bb1a
Detects suspicious Ruby on Rails exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts
Author: Bhabesh Raj
· 2023-02-23 · logsource: category=webserver · 0e1ebc5a-15d0-4bf6-8199-b2535397433a
Detects the potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2023-23752 an Improper access check, in web service endpoints in Joomla
Author: Nisarg Suthar
· 2025-08-01 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 0fdc7c7f-c690-4217-9ae3-31f5156eed72
Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP. It could be an indication of exploitation of a RCE vulnerability such as CVE-2025-54309.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-05-22 (modified 2023-01-25) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1012f107-b8f1-4271-af30-5aed2de89b39
Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708)
Author: jamesc-grafana
· 2024-07-11 · logsource: product=aws service=cloudtrail · 14f3f1c8-02d5-43a2-a191-91ffb52d3015
Detects changes to the security group entries for RDS databases.
This can indicate that a misconfiguration has occurred which potentially exposes the database to the public internet, a wider audience within the VPC or that removal of valid rules has occurred which could impact the availability of the database to legitimate services and users.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-11-20 · logsource: category=proxy · 15697955-6a29-47ca-92e9-0e05efae3260
Detects suspicious requests to Cisco ASA WebVpn via proxy logs associated with CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362 exploitation.
Author: Bhabesh Raj
· 2021-01-25 (modified 2023-01-02) · logsource: category=webserver · 15c312b9-00d0-4feb-8870-7d940a4bdc5e
Detects the exploitation of the TerraMaster TOS vulnerability described in CVE-2020-28188
Author: Moti Harmats
· 2023-02-11 · logsource: product=velocity category=application · 16c86189-b556-4ee8-b4c7-7e350a195a4f
Detects exceptions in velocity template renderer, this most likely happens due to dynamic rendering of user input and may lead to RCE.
Author: Bhabesh Raj
· 2021-02-24 (modified 2023-01-02) · logsource: category=webserver · 179ed852-0f9b-4009-93a7-68475910fd86
Detects the exploitation of VSphere Remote Code Execution vulnerability as described in CVE-2021-21972
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-12-22 (modified 2023-01-02) · logsource: category=webserver · 181f49fa-0b21-4665-a98c-a57025ebb8c7
Detects exploitation attempt of the OWASSRF variant targeting exchange servers It uses the OWA endpoint to access the powershell backend endpoint
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton
· 2022-07-19 (modified 2026-06-11) · logsource: category=webserver · 19aa4f58-94ca-45ff-bc34-92e533c0994a
Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools
Author: Thomas Patzke
· 2017-08-12 (modified 2020-09-01) · logsource: product=python category=application · 19aefed0-ffd4-47dc-a7fc-f8b1425e84f9
Generic rule for SQL exceptions in Python according to PEP 249
All 149 rules on the technique page →
T1550.002 Pass the Hash primary impact
- DET0409 Detection Strategy for T1550.002 - Pass the Hash (Windows)
AN1144 WindowsDetects anomalous NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that occur without accompanying domain logon events, especially from lateral systems or involving built-in administrative tools. Monitors for mismatches between source user context and system being accessed. Correlates LogonSession creation, NTLM authentications, and process/service initiation to identify suspicious use of stolen password hashes for remote access or service logon without password entry. Detects overpass-the-hash by combining Kerberos ticket issuance with NTLM-based lateral movement.Tunable:
TimeWindowSourceAccountAnomalyThresholdLogonTypeFilter
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1550.002 (6)
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (source), Dominik Schaudel (rule)
· 2018-02-12 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 192a0330-c20b-4356-90b6-7b7049ae0b87
Detects successful logon with logon type 9 (NewCredentials) which matches the Overpass the Hash behavior of e.g Mimikatz's sekurlsa::pth module.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-05-31 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae
This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost
Author: Dave Kennedy, Jeff Warren (method) / David Vassallo (rule)
· 2019-06-14 (modified 2022-10-05) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b
Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2018-06-08 (modified 2024-07-22) · logsource: product=windows service=ntlm · 98c3bcf1-56f2-49dc-9d8d-c66cf190238b
Detects logons using NTLM, which could be caused by a legacy source or attackers
Author: Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-04-26 (modified 2023-06-06) · logsource: product=windows service=system · e9d4ab66-a532-4ef7-a502-66a9e4a34f5d
Detects the reporting of NTLMv1 being used between a client and server. NTLMv1 is insecure as the underlying encryption algorithms can be brute-forced by modern hardware.
Author: Ilias el Matani (rule), The Information Assurance Directorate at the NSA (method)
· 2017-03-08 (modified 2023-12-15) · logsource: product=windows service=security · f8d98d6c-7a07-4d74-b064-dd4a3c244528
Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network
T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets exploitation technique
- DET0522 Detect Kerberos Ticket Theft or Forgery (T1558)
AN1443 WindowsDetects anomalous Kerberos activity such as forged or stolen tickets by correlating malformed fields in logon events, RC4-encrypted TGTs, or TGS requests without corresponding TGT requests. Also detects suspicious processes accessing LSASS memory for ticket extraction.Tunable:
TicketLifetimeThresholdEncryptionTypesProcessAllowlistAN1444 LinuxDetects suspicious access to SSSD secrets database and Kerberos key material indicating ticket theft or replay attempts. Correlates anomalous file access with unusual Kerberos service ticket requests.Tunable:SecretsAccessThresholdUnusualServiceAccountsAN1445 macOSDetects attempts to forge or replay Kerberos tickets by monitoring Unified Logs for anomalous kinit/klist activity and correlating unusual authentication sequences.macos:unifiedlogUnusual Kerberos TGS-REQ without TGT or anomalous ticket lifetime→ DC0088 Logon Session MetadataTunable:TicketRequestPatternsTicketLifetime
Sigma rules tagged attack.t1558 (6)
Author: frack113
· 2022-10-14 · logsource: product=windows service=security · 5a44727c-3b85-4713-8c44-4401d5499629
Detects possible Kerberos Replay Attack on the domain controllers when "KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT" Kerberos response is sent to the client
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
· 2018-09-09 (modified 2026-06-15) · logsource: category=antivirus · 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
Author: frack113
· 2022-10-14 (modified 2023-12-14) · logsource: product=windows service=security · 94309181-d345-4cbf-b5fe-061769bdf9cb
Detects logon with "Special groups" and "Special Privileges" can be thought of as Administrator groups or privileges.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE
· 2021-11-08 (modified 2024-06-27) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 9e099d99-44c2-42b6-a6d8-54c3545cab29
Detects the creation of files created by mimikatz such as ".kirbi", "mimilsa.log", etc.
Author: frack113
· 2025-03-05 · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5
Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation.
Author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
· 2019-10-24 (modified 2024-03-15) · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74
Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.