Techniques › T1055 › T1055.012
T1055.012 Process Hollowing
stealth · privilege escalation — Windows · attack.mitre.org · JSON
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MITRE detection strategy
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analytics
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Sigma rules tagged attack.t1055.012
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KEV CVEs mapped here
<p>Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.</p><p>Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreateProcess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code> before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.</p><p>This is very similar to Thread Local Storage but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.</p>
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique · CTID Mappings Explorer
| CVE | Vendor / product | Mapping type | State | Added |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-0386 | Linux Kernel | exploitation technique | Stale | 2025-06-17 |
Detection strategy · ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2
- DET0382 Detection Strategy for Process Hollowing on Windows v1.0
AN1076 WindowsDetects adversary use of suspended process creation, using the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag via CreateProcess, followed by unmapping the memory of the child process (NtUnmapViewOfSection) and replacing it with malicious code via VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, then SetThreadContext and ResumeThread to begin execution within the hollowed process.etw:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process
NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext, ResumeThread→ DC0021 OS API ExecutionTunable:HollowedImageNamePatternTimeWindow_ProcessCreateToResumeSuspendedProcessStartFlagMemoryWriteSizeThreshold
Sigma rules · SigmaHQ da9bb07d64, tag attack.t1055.012
Author: @SBousseaden (detection), Thomas Patzke (rule)
· 2019-02-01 (modified 2023-05-05) · logsource: product=windows category=create_remote_thread · 2e4e488a-6164-4811-9ea1-f960c7359c40
Detects remote thread creation from CACTUSTORCH as described in references.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2025-07-01 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 85d23b42-9a9d-4f8f-b3d7-d2733c1d58f5
Detects usage of HollowReaper, a process hollowing shellcode launcher used for stealth payload execution through process hollowing.
It replaces the memory of a legitimate process with custom shellcode, allowing the attacker to execute payloads under the guise of trusted binaries.
Author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io', Sittikorn S
· 2022-01-25 (modified 2023-11-28) · logsource: product=windows category=process_tampering · c4b890e5-8d8c-4496-8c66-c805753817cd
Detects when a memory process image does not match the disk image, indicative of process hollowing.
Author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io)
· 2023-10-27 (modified 2024-01-26) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d8937fe7-42d5-4b4d-8178-e089c908f63f
Detects the execution of rundll32 that leads to the invocation of legitimate Windows binaries.
The malware Pikabot has been seen to use this technique for process hollowing through hard-coded Windows binaries
Author: Liran Ravich
· 2025-11-14 (modified 2026-03-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd
Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns.
This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.
Rules tagged at the parent level (attack.t1055) 37
These target the parent technique, not this sub-technique specifically. Listed for completeness, not counted as coverage.
Author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
· 2019-10-27 (modified 2025-12-08) · logsource: product=windows category=create_remote_thread · 02d1d718-dd13-41af-989d-ea85c7fab93f
Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-07-30 (modified 2026-06-18) · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a
Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles
Author: frack113
· 2022-12-31 · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 0fa66f66-e3f6-4a9c-93f8-4f2610b00171
Detect usage of the "coregen.exe" (Microsoft CoreCLR Native Image Generator) binary to sideload arbitrary DLLs.
Author: David Ledbetter (shellcode), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2018-11-17 (modified 2024-01-25) · logsource: product=windows category=ps_script · 16b37b70-6fcf-4814-a092-c36bd3aafcbd
Detects Base64 encoded Shellcode
Author: David Burkett, @signalblur
· 2019-12-28 (modified 2022-06-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 16c37b52-b141-42a5-a3ea-bbe098444397
It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space.
Author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
· 2024-12-19 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 19b3806e-46f2-4b4c-9337-e3d8653245ea
Detects the execution of more.com and vbc.exe in the process tree.
This behavior was observed by a set of samples related to Lummac Stealer.
The Lummac payload is injected into the vbc.exe process.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-03-05 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 1cc50f3f-1fc8-4acf-b2e9-6f172e1fdebd
Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that invokes inline VBScript as seen being used by UNC2452
Author: Bhabesh Raj
· 2022-03-11 (modified 2024-07-02) · logsource: product=windows category=process_access · 250ae82f-736e-4844-a68b-0b5e8cc887da
Detects potential shellcode injection as seen used by tools such as Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-09-07 (modified 2022-10-09) · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
Detects an image load pattern as seen when a tool named PRIVATELOG is used and rarely observed under legitimate circumstances
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-10-14 (modified 2024-08-29) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 396f6630-f3ac-44e3-bfc8-1b161bc00c4e
Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process
Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-08-23 (modified 2025-10-08) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 3c1b5fb0-c72f-45ba-abd1-4d4c353144ab
Detects process creation events that use the Sysnative folder (common for CobaltStrike spawns)
Author: elhoim
· 2022-04-28 (modified 2022-06-02) · logsource: product=windows category=file_event · 409f8a98-4496-4aaa-818a-c931c0a8b832
This rule detects suspicious files created by Microsoft Sync Center (mobsync)
Author: omkar72, oscd.community
· 2020-10-14 (modified 2023-02-23) · logsource: product=windows category=image_load · 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea
Detects .NET CLR DLLs being loaded by scripting applications such as wscript or cscript. This could be an indication of potential suspicious execution.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-10-11 · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · 4d0083b3-580b-40da-9bba-626c19fe4033
Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool CoercedPotato
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-08-23 (modified 2023-12-21) · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · 637f689e-b4a5-4a86-be0e-0100a0a33ba2
Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool EfsPotato
Author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community
· 2019-10-27 (modified 2025-07-08) · logsource: product=windows category=create_remote_thread · 66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119
Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.
Author: Sittikorn S, Nuttakorn T, Tim Shelton
· 2021-07-01 (modified 2023-10-23) · logsource: category=antivirus · 6fe1719e-ecdf-4caf-bffe-4f501cb0a561
Detects the suspicious file that is created from PoC code against Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527 (PrinterNightmare), CVE-2021-1675 .
Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-12-09 (modified 2026-07-05) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 71158e3f-df67-472b-930e-7d287acaa3e1
Detects process creation events where the Image field lacks an absolute path,
which occurs when the backing file no longer exists on disk at the time of
logging - commonly caused by Process Ghosting or other unorthodox process creation techniques.
Author: Alexander McDonald
· 2022-06-24 (modified 2023-02-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 744a188b-0415-4792-896f-11ddb0588dbc
Detects potential process injection via Microsoft Remote Asssistance (Msra.exe) by looking at suspicious child processes spawned from the aforementioned process. It has been a target used by many threat actors and used for discovery and persistence tactics
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-07-30 (modified 2024-01-26) · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7
Detects the creation of a named pipe with a pattern found in CobaltStrike malleable C2 profiles
Author: @kostastsale
· 2023-08-07 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · 89e1490f-1a3e-452a-bbb8-b68a5f58072f
Detects the execution of installed GuLoader malware on the host.
GuLoader is initiating network connections via the rundll32.exe process that is spawned via a browser parent(injected) process.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), @unresolvedhost
· 2026-04-17 · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · 9b4e7c2a-3f6d-4a8b-b5e9-1c7d3f2e6a4b
Detects the creation of a named pipe with the hardcoded name "REDSUN".
The RedSun exploit tool uses a pipe with this name for synchronisation and command communication between its components during the Cloud Files API + oplock-based AV bypass and privilege escalation chain.
RedSun creates the pipe as \\??\pipe\REDSUN.
The pipe server listens for the token-duplicated elevated process to connect and respond, completing the privilege escalation from user to SYSTEM.
Presence of this pipe name indicates active or recent RedSun execution.
Author: elhoim
· 2022-04-28 (modified 2024-03-12) · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · 9f2cc74d-78af-4eb2-bb64-9cd1d292b87b
Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2026-04-17 · logsource: product=windows service=windefend · a7c3e5f2-8b1d-4e9a-b6c2-3d7f5e8a9b4c
Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe
dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present.
This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based
AV bypass/privilege escalation tool.
RedSun works as follows:
1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\
2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger
a Defender scan and remediation attempt
3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file
4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open
5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect
\\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path
6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges
Author: Splunk Research Team
· 2024-07-29 (modified 2025-07-04) · logsource: product=windows category=create_remote_thread · a9d4d3fa-8fc0-41bc-80b1-30b9fda79d6f
Detects remote thread creation in command shell applications, such as "Cmd.EXE" and "PowerShell.EXE".
It is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden (idea)
· 2019-06-17 (modified 2025-10-17) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · b655a06a-31c0-477a-95c2-3726b83d649d
Detects a suspicious child process of userinit
Author: John Lambert (tech), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2017-03-04 (modified 2021-11-27) · logsource: product=windows category=process_access · b7967e22-3d7e-409b-9ed5-cdae3f9243a1
Detects a process access to verclsid.exe that injects shellcode from a Microsoft Office application / VBA macro
Author: frack113
· 2025-10-17 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · bafd07c6-3ea5-454a-b4be-058fbb073de7
Detects when an executable launches an identical instance of itself, a behavior often used to create a suspended “sacrificial” process for code injection or evasion.
Investigate for indicators such as the process being started in suspended mode, rapid parent termination, memory manipulation (e.g., WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread), or unsigned binaries.
Review command-line arguments, process ancestry, and network activity to confirm if this is legitimate behavior or process injection activity.
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
· 2026-07-23 · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d2b7a134-9c3e-4f8a-b56d-e0c1f8a29b47
Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki
· 2021-05-25 (modified 2022-10-31) · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2
Detects the creation of a named pipe as used by CobaltStrike
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2021-12-07 (modified 2023-02-04) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · d78b5d61-187d-44b6-bf02-93486a80de5a
Detects the use of the Dinject PowerShell cradle based on the specific flags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2019-01-10 (modified 2023-02-03) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e6eb5a96-9e6f-4a18-9cdd-642cfda21c8e
Detects potential Dridex acitvity via specific process patterns
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
· 2022-06-27 (modified 2023-05-15) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e7888eb1-13b0-4616-bd99-4bc0c2b054b9
Detects a "dllhost" process spawning with no commandline arguments which is very rare to happen and could indicate process injection activity or malware mimicking similar system processes.
Author: EagleEye Team
· 2020-05-14 (modified 2024-02-02) · logsource: product=windows category=network_connection · e81528db-fc02-45e8-8e98-4e84aba1f10b
Detects a network connection that is initiated by the "notepad.exe" process.
This might be a sign of process injection from a beacon process or something similar.
Notepad rarely initiates a network communication except when printing documents for example.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
· 2023-10-11 (modified 2024-11-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · e8d34729-86a4-4140-adfd-0a29c2106307
Detects the use of CoercedPotato, a tool for privilege escalation
Author: Liran Ravich
· 2025-11-14 (modified 2026-03-23) · logsource: product=windows category=process_creation · f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd
Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns.
This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance.
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), blueteam0ps, elhoim
· 2017-11-06 (modified 2023-08-07) · logsource: product=windows category=pipe_created · fe3ac066-98bb-432a-b1e7-a5229cb39d4a
Detects the creation of a named pipe seen used by known APTs or malware.